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Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are responsible of
controlling and monitoring industrial processes and critical infrastructures, such
as electricity generation, gas production, and water distribution. In the few past
years, several security incidents have been reported on SCADA systems. The
consequences of these attacks ranged from small operations disturbance to loss of
human lives. Therefore, there is an urgent need to carry out a security analysis of
SCADA systems and to design appropriate security solutions. Security testing on
live SCADA systems, however, is not practical due to the difficulty and the cost
related to the implementation. In addition, evaluation of some security vulnerabili-
ties, such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, may lead to the delay or interruption
of SCADA services, which is not acceptable for real-time monitoring of critical in-
frastructures and operating systems. Therefore, such necessary solutions require
xi
extensive testing and validation prior to their implementation. In this thesis, a
SCADA simulation environment for testing and evaluating SCADA attacks and
mitigation techniques is presented. The simulation environment is designed and
developed in such way to allow hybrid architectures (involving simulated as well as
physical components). Two realistic SCADA configurations are designed using our
proposed environment, namely , water tanks control and smart grid systems. In
addition, the testbed allowed us to test successfully a set of serious network attacks
on a physical PLC including replay and Man-In-The-Middle (MiTM) attacks.
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 ومراقبة العمليات التحكم فينظمة المسؤولة ، هي الأ)سكادا( وجممي  البياناتنظمة التحكم الاشرافيأ
في السنوات القليلة . الصناعية والبنى التحتية الحساسة، مثل توليد الكهرباء، انتاج الغاز وتوزي  المياه
وتراوحت عواقب هذه الحوادث مابين  .، تم تسجيل العديد من الحوادث الأمنية في أنظمة سكاداالماضية
 يةمنلألذلك، هناك حاجة ملحة لإجراء تحليل  .العمليات الصناعية إلى خسائر في الأرواح اداء في خلل
وم  ذلك، ليس عمليا ًاجراء جمارب أمنية على أنظمة . نظم سكادا وتصميم الحلول الأمنية المناسبة
من الضروري إجراء اختبارات  ،لذلك .سكادا اثناء عملها نتيجة للصعوبة والتكلفة المرتبطة بالتنفيذ
 .مكثفة للحلول الأمنية والتحقق منها قبل تطبيقها
وكذلك  اسكادتبار الهجمات الأمنية على أنظمة في هذه الأطروحة، سيتم عرض بيئة محاكاة لغرض اخ
حيث تم تصميم وتطوير بيئة المحاكاة بحيث تتيح بناء أنظمة هجينة جمم   .تتقنيات كشف هذه الهجما
 .تهامحاكاتم اخرى مكونات مادية و بين 
تم تصميم نموذجين لأنظمة سكادا باستخدام بيئة المحاكاة المقترحة، وهي نظام التحكم في خزانات توزي  
مجموعة من خدام هذه الأنظمة لإختبار بالإضافة إلى ذلك، تم است. وشبكة الكهرباء الذكية. المياة
 )sCLP( الهجمات الأمنية على اجهزة التحكم
 
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces our motivation to pursue this research. It highlights
the current security issues affecting SCADA systems and also gives an overview
of the main ideas developed in this thesis. It goes further presenting how the
introduced concepts provide a better environment for evaluating the security of
SCADA systems
1.1 Motivation
SCADA systems are widely used to monitor and supervise critical infrastructure
and industrial processes. Such systems are vital for our society and responsible
for providing such many services on different fields. They are used in electricity
and water distribution, oil and gas production, managing railways and controlling
street traffic and in processing and recycling our waste, etc. Therefore, security
of such systems cannot be overstated since any interruption or disruption to such
systems can have a direct harmful effect on our live.
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In the last few years, the number of cyber attacks targeting SCADA systems
increased dramatically. According to Dell security annual threat report released
in 2015 [1], the number of cyber attacks against SCADA systems doubled in 2014
compared with the number of cyber attacks against SCADA systems in 2013,
see figure 1.1. ”Since companies are only required to report data breaches that
involve personal or payment information, SCADA attacks often go unreported,”
said Patrick Sweeney, executive director, Dell Security. ”This lack of information
sharing combined with an aging industrial machinery infrastructure presents huge
security challenges that will continue to grow in the coming months and years.”
Figure 1.1: SCADA hits monthly [1]
Historically, SCADA components were special-purpose embedded devices con-
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nected through a proprietary communication bus. Vendors would typically offer
turn key solutions, which would be incompatible with competitors systems. Secu-
rity was not a main concern in the design of these systems, instead major concerns
regarded real-time processing, and event notification [2]. Despite the lack of se-
curity features, SCADA vendors and operators believed they could rely on two
forms of protection. The first is employing an air gap, that is, a SCADA network
would be physically isolated from any other networks, thus making it harder for an
attacker to gain access. Secondly, they relied on security through obscurity, that
is, vendors and operators believed that very little, if any, information was pub-
licly available about their environments, and this lack of information made their
systems secure. Security concerns focused on restricting access to unmanned field
networks and on preventing configuration mistakes [3].
A number of SCADA systems are still using legacy devices while they are di-
rectly or indirectly connected to the Internet. This is because sharing of real-time
information with the business operations has become a necessity for improving effi-
ciency, minimizing costs, and maximizing profits. This, however, exposes SCADA
systems to various types of exploitation. Therefore, it is important to identify
common attacks and develop security solutions tailored to SCADA systems. How-
ever, to do so, it is impractical to evaluate security solutions on industrial systems
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while in operation because of the difficulty and the cost of implementing stan-
dalone SCADA systems, in addition to the potential risk of failure and downtime
of SCADA services that may be caused during implementation of security solu-
tions. Therefore, the key problem of developing and improving particular security
solutions for SCADA systems is the lack of suitable modeling and testing tools to
evaluate those solutions prior to their adoption and implementation. Moreover,
most of the SCADA testbeds [4, 5, 6] are proprietary used only by researchers
within organizations and the software is not shared for public use. In general, to
come up with simulation environment for SCADA systems that can be used for
evaluating the security issues, a set of requirements has to be satisfied. First, the
simulator should be composed of simple, flexible, and reusable components. Sec-
ond, the simulator should be extensible and supports easy interconnection with
other simulators and/or real modules.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
This thesis provides the following contributions to the field of SCADA systems
and their security.
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• Design and implementation of SCADA security simulation environment with
a key benefit of building SCADA security testbeds that allows the simulation
of various SCADA components, security attacks, and security solutions with
ability to interface with real physical devices.
• Security analysis of the network communication between Simatic Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs) and the engineering stations in charge of setting
up and configuring them.
• Implementing and carrying out a set of serious network attacks targeting
Simatic PLC leading to serious compromise of the PLC.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
The thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapters 5-7 represent the main contribu-
tions of the thesis. The other chapters are respectively the introduction, SCADA
systems, SCADA security, SCADA simulation related work and finally the con-
clusion and future work chapter. The thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 gives introduction about SCADA systems, their architecture, main
components and some of the common protocols used by SCADA systems. Chap-
ter 3 provides overview about SCADA security through describing how it is dif-
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ferent from IT security, attacks targeting SCADA systems and finally the security
solutions for SCADA systems. Literature review of the related work is provided
in chapter 4.
Chapter 5 describes implementation details of the introduced simulation envi-
ronment. This chapter provides overview of the tools and techniques used to
implement the simulation environment, the multiple implemented components
that shape the simulation environment, the implemented industrial protocols and
implemented interfaces that connect the simulation environment with the real ex-
ternal devices.
In order to evaluate the introduced simulation environment, Chapter 6 presents
several use cases. It shows how the simulation environment can be used along
with available physical devices to construct security testbeds to analyze the se-
curity of SCADA systems as well as evaluating security solutions. In chapter 7,
one of the testbed presented in Chapter 6, that includes real common PLC, is
used to carry out three network attacks leading to serious compromise of typical
PLCs. In addition, simulation of some attacks targeting SCADA systems would
be described.
Finally, chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarizing the presented work and
provides recommendations that can be considered for pursuing a future work.
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CHAPTER 2
SCADA SYSTEMS
2.1 SCADA Architecture
SCADA is a system that operates over communication channels for monitoring
and controlling industrial and manufacturing processes and facilities, in addition
to providing control over remote equipment. It is a type of Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) that monitor and control industrial processes and it is distinguished
from other ICS systems in that it is large-scale processes including multiple sites
and operating over large distances. SCADA system collects and analyzes realtime
data from remote equipment such as pumps, valves, etc. and provides overall
remote actuation and control. Today, SCADA systems reached a high level of
domination that most of US national infrastructures depend on SCADA systems
to a high degree [7].
SCADA systems can be relatively simple, a single circuit that notifies you of one
event, such as self-contained SCADA systems that are built for a given applica-
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tion, and the ones that monitor the environmental conditions of a small building,
or more complex, such as a system that monitor all the activity in a nuclear plant.
SCADA systems consist of hardware and software components as depicted in
figure 2.1. The hardware components gather data and push it into a computer
that has SCADA software. The SCADA software then processes and presents
this data in a timely manner and makes the appropriate controlling decisions if
necessary. All events are recorded by SCADA into log files stored on a database or
sent to a printer. Alarms are raised when conditions become risky or hazardous.
These operations are performed by different kinds of SCADA components [8].
The sensors (either digital or analogue) collect data from the managed system
or equipment. Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) deployed in the field at specific
sites and locations gather reports from sensors and deliver commands to control
relays. The collected data is moved through a communications network to the
master units, these are larger computers that serve as the central processor for
the SCADA system to automatically regulate the managed system in response to
the sensors inputs [8].
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Figure 2.1: Typical SCADA Architecture
2.2 SCADA Components
A typical deployment of a SCADA system contains the following components:
• Human Machine Interface (HMI):
HMI is the means through which data collected and stored is presented to hu-
man operators in understandable and comprehensible forms. This includes
easy-to-understand screen layouts, detailed schematics, pictorial represen-
tation, and animations representing the running states and health of the
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field equipment and machines. In addition, HMIs enable human operators
to interact with the processes through a touch screen, keyboard or both.
With HMI, human operators interact with SCADA systems in a simple,
clear and easy to understand way. Recently, HMIs have become web-based
applications, consequently, users interact with them through web browsers.
• Master Terminal Unit (MTU):
MTU is the repository of the real-time data collected from the remote ter-
minal units and transferred to it through SCADA network. Equivalent to a
master unit in a master/ slave architecture. SCADA software on the master
station must be able to collect and retrieve data values from the RTUs, store,
process and present it to the operator through the HMI and transmits con-
trol signals to the remote site. Operator HMIs are connected to the MTU
by a LAN/WAN so that the viewing screens and associated data can be
displayed for the operators [8]. The processing may include unit conversion,
recording or cataloging into tables etc.
• Remote Terminal Unit (RTU):
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) functions as a slave in the master/slave ar-
chitecture. Collects and processes I/O in an intelligent manner. The Inputs
data from sensors, switches and transmitters is read by RTU and then trans-
mits the data to the MTU in a format understood by SCADA system. The
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RTU also converts the SCADA system digital control signals into the suit-
able form, discrete or analog, understood by the device under control [7].
RTUs are different from PLCs in that they are better suited for wireless
communications. This makes RTUs ideal in renewable energy applications
like wind and solar farms. RTUs commonly use the Modbus (or some other)
protocol to connect to SCADA and HMI software. The data rate between
the RTU and controlled device is relatively high[9].
• Programmable Logic Controller (PLC):
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a microprocessor into which a pro-
gram is fed so that it can control several functions in industrial processes.
Over the years, the functionality or the job of the PLC has developed to
involve process control, relay control, distributed systems control, motion
control, and networking. They were initially invented to replace the electro-
magnetic relays and the cumbersome wirings in a control circuit. In some
modern PLCs, data handling, processing power, storage, and communica-
tion capabilities are , to some extent, equivalent to desktop computers. The
process logic or sequence of operation is executed as per a software or control
logic program. However, PLC differs from a desktop computer. Unlike com-
puters, PLCs have multiple number of inputs and outputs, and are designed
for performing a strict and bumpy operations under extreme industrial con-
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ditions. They operate under higher or increased temperature ranges, have
resistance to vibration and impact, and have immunity to electrical noise.
PLCs can be (re)configured using proprietary software installed on a stan-
dard computer (typically with Microsoft Windows OS). Reconfiguring the
PLC consists in changing the control system software, known also as the
programming layer of the PLC. A very common example of the configura-
tion software is the Siemens Simatic Step 7 [10] for Simatic controllers. The
software allows engineers to perform three main tasks: (1) write the graph-
ical ladder logic code, (2) compile it to machine code for execution and (3)
upload the compiled code to the device.
• Communication Means:
Communication media/methods between the central host computer servers
and the remote field-based controllers through which data can be trans-
ferred to and from different sites [8]. The communication can be established
through wired or wireless networks, Internet or the public telephone network
[9].
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2.3 SCADA Protocols
In order to establish a communication between any entities, a protocol for that
communication has to be defined. A protocol states the form of the messages and
the rules for the exchange of messages. High-level models are used to state where
the protocols are applied and to break down the functions needed for the sake of
sending and receiving messages. The layered architecture model is one of those
models widely used in which the elements necessary to establish a communica-
tion are separated into layers connected together through interfaces. The Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) and the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) are the two most widely used layered communication
models [9].
The OSI model is constructed of 7 layers where each layer uses specific proto-
cols to define its function. In this model, data pass form higher-to-lower level
layers such that data is encapsulated by the next layer while passing through lay-
ers on the sender node. For instance, a packet of data from a higher layer would
be encapsulated in the next lower layer by adding header information. On the
receiving node, the reverse process happens, packets pass from lower-to-higher
level layers. The encapsulation is stripped from messages while they move from
down-to-up layers. The TCP/IP model is constructed of 4 layers and the various
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capabilities of the Internet are based on the TCP/IP protocols.
Protocols of SCADA systems evolved from propriety hardware and software de-
signed specifically for SCADA systems. The protocols were developed out of
necessity to serve the burgeoning market for computer application in real time
control situation. Then SCADA protocols inserted versions of Internet and LAN
technologies in an effort to take advantages of new networking developments. This
resulted in some standardization commonly used in IT environment [9].
During the past three decades, hundreds (150 - 200) of these protocols have been
developed for communications based on both serial, LAN and WAN in a wide
variety of industries including petrochemical and electrical generation or distri-
bution [11]. Of these, approximately 10 protocols currently dominate the indus-
trial marketplace and include systems such as MODBUS, DNP3, EtherNET/IP,
PROFIBUS and Foundation Fieldbus [12]. Following sections would provide a
brief description of the commonly used protocols for SCADA systems.
• MODBUS Protocol
MODBUS protocol was developed by Modicon and has become defacto stan-
dard communication protocol. Modbus protocol is positioned in the applica-
tion layer of OSI model and supports client-server communications between
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PLCs and other SCADA system components. It defines means for connect-
ing industrial devices, such as PLCs, RTUs, MTU, etc. together and for de-
tecting reporting and errors. MODBUS communication use a master-slave
technique in which only the master device can send commands(transactions)
called queries. The other devices(the slaves) just respond by providing the
requested data to the master or by performing the requested action [9, 13].
Modbus protocol is used in industrial environment for the reasons that it was
designed considering industrial applications, it is an open standard protocol
and royalty-free, and it is easily deployed and maintained. The development
and update of Modbus protocol has been managed by the Modbus Organi-
zation [14].
• DNP3 Protocol
DNP3 is an open SCADA protocol used for communication between com-
ponents in process automation systems. It is widely used by utilities such as
water and electricity companies. It plays a crucial role in SCADA systems
for the exchange of data and control instructions between master station,
RTUs and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). The typical commands is-
sued by master station are ”open a valve”,”start a motor”, and ”provide
data on a particular control station”. The out-stations also provide the
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master station with information such as status of circuit breaker, pressures,
analog signals representing such items as temperatures or powers. DNP3 has
also been adapted to Internet technologies by using TCP/IP for exchange
of DNP3 messages [9, 15].
• Profibus Protocol
Process Field Bus (Profibus) is a open standard for fieldbus communica-
tion in time-critical control and data acquisition applications. It was pro-
moted by German department of education and research and then used by
Siemens. Since Profibus is an open standard, it can accommodate devices
from different manufacturers. It resides at the application, data link, and
physical layers of the OSI model. Profibus has advanced through a handful
of revisions and as a result, there are three versions of Profibus: Profibus
Fieldbus Message Specification (FMS), Profibus Process Automation (PA),
and Profibus Factory Automation (Decentralized Peripherals DP) [9].
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CHAPTER 3
SCADA SECURITY
In the recent years, there has been a noticed growth in the number of incidents
against SCADA systems. According to a recent report, which was published in
2013 by ICS-CERT (U.S. Department of Homeland Security ) [16], the number
of intrusions, attacks, scanning, and footprinting activities against the critical
infrastructure in U.S. is growing continuously. Just in 2013, ICS-CERT reported
and analyzed more than 250 incidents, particularly in the networks of industrial
companies. The report stated that, ”because reporting of cyber incidents is done
on a voluntary basis, it is estimated that many more incidents are occurring
but are not reported.” Moreover, large number of incidents are not detected due
to the lack of sufficient logging and detection capabilities [17]. Another report
published by Dell security in 2015 showed that the number of SCADA cyber
attacks doubled in 2014 [1]. Therefore, as these systems began to change and
became more interconnected, operators, however, began to recognize that cyber
security was a real concern that must be addressed in order to maintain the safety
and reliability of process control. This chapter highlights SCADA security by
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describing the difference between SCADA systems and Information Technology
(IT) systems security and what are the common attacks targeting SCADA systems
and finally, some of the security solutions used for securing SCADA systems would
be stated.
3.1 SCADA vs. IT Security
SCADA systems have several characteristics that differentiate them from IT sys-
tems in terms of operational priorities and risks. The control components of
SCADA systems are optimized to provide real-time performance and reliable ser-
vice with a reasonable cost. There are little computing cycles and extra memory
sufficient to execute other functions such that related to performing security tasks
and SCADA systems use unconventional operating systems and software. In ad-
dition, the primary and most important goal in IT is to protect the central servers
and not the clients. Contrary to IT systems, in SCADA systems, the edge client
devices such as PLCs are the backbone of SCADA systems and are of great im-
portance compared to central edges such as data historian servers [18].
The security of information system was not inherited in SCADA protocols. At
the time when SCADA protocols were developed, SCADA systems were isolated
from the outside world and were working in closed environments. Today, SCADA
18
systems are connected to corporate IT networks and they are using protocols that
are targets for attacks in the IT world.
One big challenge that SCADA systems face is the inability to deploy vulnerability
countermeasures, that are usually used with IT networks. In IT networks, An-
tivirus and encryption are commonly employed. Network administrators perform
penetration testing and auditing of information security. Employees are trained
on information security and hence have an increased awareness. An upgrading
or replacing of equipment is done every couple of years. In addition, software is
updated and patched on regular basis. On the other hand, none or just a few of
these countermeasures are considered in SCADA networks. Antivirus are difficult
to be employed in SCADA networks because delays can not be tolerated. The
performance of the network is affected negatively with encryption. Penetration
testing is rarely done due to the high potentiality of disturbing the control system.
Software is patched and updated on infrequent basis because of the need to care-
ful planning and cooperation of the different component vendors. Equipment can
stay for years without replacing or upgrading, running applications and operating
systems with known vulnerabilities [9]. Table 3.1 summarizes characteristics of
SCADA systems vs. IT systems.
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IT Systems SCADA Systems
Data loss caused by disturbance
can be recovered
Disturbance may lead to disastrous
consequences
Delays can be accepted Real-time actions & responses
Tolerate rebooting & crashes Must be running 24/7
Antivirus commonly used Inadmissible delays caused by antivirus
High security awareness and training Lack of security awareness and training
Encryption commonly used Encryption rarely used
Regular penetration testing Rare penetration testing with high care
Regular application of patches
Patches are applied infrequently,
carefully and with vendors’ cooperation
Replacement of equipment per
three-to-five years
Equipment run for decades without
replacement
Regular information security audits Rare information security audits
Table 3.1: IT systems vs. SCADA systems.
3.2 SCADA Attacks
Increasingly, SCADA systems are connected to corporate networks, in order to
maximize benefits by enabling leaders to track and control real-time production,
watch changes in the production and react accordingly. Moreover, Ethernet,
TCP/IP, Wireless technologies such as IEEE 802.x and Bluetooth have been
adopted in SCADA systems. However, such interconnection exposes SCADA or
industrial control systems to attacks. The control network can be penetrated by
remote attackers without having any physical access by exploiting the gateways
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vulnerabilities between SCADA and corporate networks. Moreover, the recent
trend for using commercial and open source software decreased the development
and deployment costs. On the other side, the attackers require less knowledge
about the operation of the control system than was required when proprietary
protocols and hardware were prevalent [19].
Cyber attacks on SCADA systems can take a route through connections to In-
ternet or enterprise networks or through connections with other networks such as
connection to satellite and wireless networks. The most common attacks against
SCADA systems can be classified as follows [18].
• Protocol vulnerabilities
• Network backdoors
• Field devices attacks
• Database attacks
• Man-in-the-middle attacks
• Time provision and synchronization attacks
With the successful penetration of SCADA systems, the following malicious acts
can be performed [18, 8, 20]
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• System shutdown through using Denial-of-Service (DoS)
• Compromise the function of RTUs/PLCs
• Get access to master stations and gain control of system by planting Malware
• Retrieve SCADA system passwords by log keystrokes from operators
• Gain access to SCADA systems
• Shut down the control devices such as PLCs using, for example, replay attack
• Send modified incorrect data to master stations by spoofing RTUs
• Preform wrong actions by spoofing control stations such as PLCs
• Disturb communications between operator stations and control stations
3.3 SCADA Security Solutions
With the security threats and challenges that face SCADA systems, there is an in-
creased interest for techniques and tools that could be adopted in order to improve
the security of SCADA systems. Figure 3.1 illustrates the typical defenses or se-
curity countermeasures employed in corporate/IT network and their relationship
with the SCADA network. Recently, security mechanisms for SCADA systems
have been adopted, many of these are used in IT security.
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Figure 3.1: Security defenses relationship between IT and SCADA networks [8]
Following are a set of techniques that could be implemented in order to improve
the cyber security of SCADA systems [9].
• Analyze SCADA network and its nodes for vulnerabilities
• Use network encryption, strong authentication and isolate SCADA network
from unnecessary external connections
• Disable all unnecessary services
• Adopt firewalls compatible with SCADA protocols
• Install and configure Intrusion Detection systems (IDSs)
• Integrate patch management with SCADA systems
• Apply configuration management of SCADA network, software and hardware
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• Develop and implement risk assessment, security audits and incidents re-
sponse plans
• Conduct security awareness programs and training
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CHAPTER 4
SCADA SIMULATION RELATED WORK
A number of research papers focused on developing simulation environments of
SCADA systems. In this chapter, we present work related to developing simula-
tion environments for the sake of investigating SCADA security issues. McDonald
et al. [21] described a virtual control system environment developed at Sandia
National Laboratories for investigating SCADA vulnerabilities in the filed of en-
ergy systems. As set of assumptions, that have to be made for developing hybrid
models, have been discussed. Simulated RTUs interacted with simulated power
systems (PowerWorld server) were used to represent the control system. While
both simulated and real components were included in the cyber layer. However,
the proposed environment is constrained on Power Systems and does not support
a wide variety of physical processes.
Chabukswar et al. [22] concentrated on demonstrating the use of Command and
Control Wind-Tunnel (C2WT), framework used more widely in research, with the
aim to simulate DDOS-like attacks on a plant and its control system as well as to
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analyze the effects on different routers. The C2WT framework is based on High
Level Architecture (HLA) and it was designed to facilitate the development of
large-scale simulations. It uses the Generic Modeling Environment and employs
model-based design techniques and graphical interface to allow integration of di-
verse simulation engines. The authors use the NetworkSim, which is based on
OMNeT++ to simulate the communication protocols and the Simulink to model
the domain specific processes. Moreover, they developed a Simulink function to
synchronize the model with the Run-Time Infrastructure allowing Simulink to
progress only when the RTI allows it. They use timed-stepped synchronization,
while keeping an appropriate small time-step size in order to minimize event tim-
ing errors introduced by exchanging events between Simulink and HLA. However,
the authors work and the used platform were designed mainly for power plant
simulations and not typical SCADA systems.
Queiroz et al. [23] proposed a SCADA simulation tool (SCADASim) developed
for SCADA security studies. Their objective was to examine the effect of attacks
in real devices and applications by using a simulated environment. Attacks that
are supported include denial of service, man in the middle, eavesdropping, and
spoofing. They use the OMNET++ to simulate the network and they exploit the
socket based integration of OMNET++ to allow the integration of the external
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devices using deployed gates. Finally, they deploy malicious attacks (denial of
service and spoofing) scenarios to evaluate the framework, and they demonstrate
how the attacks are affecting the process of using legitimate requests. However,
the work was limited to simulated attacks, and it does not provide a framework to
launch attacks from outside the simulation framework. In addition, the authors
did not mention the possibility of integrating detection techniques. The hardware
components were simulated using MATLAB/Simulink and no real physical hard-
ware was mentioned except sensors and actuators.
The work by Chunlei, Lan, and Yiqi [24] proposes a reference architecture. It
consists of several layers and components that represent the enterprise network,
the OPC server and client, the SCADA protocols tester, the RTUs, the field sen-
sors and actuators as well as the industrial infrastructure. Their prototype imple-
mentation targets the security analysis and assessment of SCADA systems. The
architecture is extensible and adaptable and it is mainly based on NS2. Moreover,
in order to allow the integration with real networks they exploit the capabilities
of emulation feature of NS2. The latter has the ability to inject traffic from the
simulator into a live network and to simulate a desired network between real ap-
plications in real-time. For the simulation framework, they use real PLC/RTUs
and sensors/actuators, as well as industrial and open source systems for OPC
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client/server implementation. Finally, for the evaluation of the simulation frame-
work, they implemented attack scenarios that compromise the security of SCADA
system and they developed methods to analyze and assess the impact of these at-
tacks. On the other hand, all SCADA components such as PLCs, RTUs are real
components and only the enterprise network has been simulated. This doubts its
ability to be used in tests that require large infrastructure.
Almalawi [25] proposed SCADA simulation framework (SCADAVT) for build-
ing a SCADA testbed based on virtualization. CORE emulator has been used
to build the framework. The essential SCADA components such as protocols,
I/O modules, and simulators of field devices have been integrated through the
plug-in service available in CORE emulator. Moreover, in order to simulate water
distribution systems, a server has been introduced with the use of the dynamic
link library (DLL) of EPANET-a modeling tool for simulating water movement
and quality behavior within pressurized pipe network. In addition, the simulated
server can be used to simulate any topology of water network systems and can
be manipulated by a custom TCP-based protocol. They presented a case study
to show how the testbed can be used to monitor and control any automated pro-
cesses. Two attacks (DDoS and integrity) have been described to demonstrate
how attacks can disrupt supervised processes.
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Mahoney and Gandhi [26] research has constructed an integrated framework for
simulating control system and monitoring of regulatory compliance in near real-
time. SCADASiM framework allows the reconstruction of SCADA network com-
ponents at the abstraction level needed for the 7 monitoring of the system as-
pects. The authors have used Autonomous Component Architecture (ACA) to
model SCADA network and in order to monitor the regularity compliance, their
research involved using of a new language called ADACS.
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CHAPTER 5
SCADA SECURITY TESTBED
This chapter presents implementation details of a simulation environment in-
tended to study and analyze SCADA systems security. The system is called:
SCADA-SST. First, an overview of the tools used to implement security environ-
ment is provided in addition to a discussion about why these tools in particular
are chosen to develop the proposed environment. Then it proceeds to present the
design and development details in the following sections.
5.1 OMNeT++
SCADA-SST environment has been implemented using OMNeT++ network sim-
ulator in combination with INET framework that contains all libraries needed to
build communication network models and implements the most common Internet
protocols, such as TCP, IP, UDP, MAC protocols, etc. [27]. OMNeT++ was cho-
sen to build SCADA-SST for several reasons. First, this work focuses on TCP/IP
protocol stack, which are included in OMNeT++. OMNeT++ is an open source
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and generic simulation engine and provides the ability to integrate with external
real devices. In addition, OMNeT++ is commonly used in the research field and
this has the benefit of building on top of others work.
OMNET++ is an extensible, modular, component-based and object-oriented dis-
crete event simulation library and framework primarily for building network simu-
lators written in C++ [28]. The main components of OMNET++ are the modules,
which can be simple modules or compound modules grouping several simple mod-
ules together, which communicate with each other by exchanging messages. The
modules communication can occur either directly through messages or through
input and output gates as depicted in figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: OMNeT++ modeling [29]
In OMNeT++, simple modules can be combined together in a hierarchy of levels
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making it possible to construct complex simulation components. Figure 5.2 shows
an example of a compound module StandardHost constructed by combining sev-
eral modules together.
Figure 5.2: OMNeT++ compound module example
OMNeT++ comes with Integrated Development Environment (IDE) based on
the Eclipse platform with extended new editors, views, wizards, and additional
functionality for the sake of creating and configuring models, running patch exe-
cutions, and evaluating the simulation results.
In OMNeT++, the general approach of simulation implementation (modeling)
can be summarized in the following steps:
32
1. Define the structure:
The simulated module structure and the various network topologies are de-
fined using NED language. This can be done using a text editor or in the
graphical editor of the eclipse-based OMNeT++ simulation IDE.
2. Define the behavior:
The behavior of the module is programmed in C++ using the simulation
kernel and class library.
3. Define runtime parameters:
The OMNeT++ specific configuration and the module parameters are grouped
in the omnetpp.ini configuration file which can describe several simulation
runs with different parameters.
4. Run the simulation:
After building the simulation, it can be run through either the command line
batch or the interactive graphical user interface.
5. Evaluate the simulation:
The simulation results are recorded in output vectors and scalar files. Those
results can be processed or visualized using the appropriate tools.
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5.2 Testbed Design
This section introduces the overall structure of SCADA-SST and its main com-
ponents. Details of the implementation will be discussed subsequently in the
following sections. Before starting with designing the proposed simulation envi-
ronment that meets the needs of SCADA security testbeds, the requirements of
a typical SCADA security testbed were specified. The need is for a testbed that
can be used to launch various security tests either to study the effect of different
attacks on SCADA systems or to test the validity and impact of detection and
mitigation techniques. Then the design phase stated the architecture of the simu-
lation environment and the main components needed to construct the simulation
environment in addition to classifying theses components according to their job
and the site in which they are used. Finally, the development phase of the simu-
lation environment was established according to the output of the design phase.
During the design phase, the specifications of typical SCADA systems in general
and the features of the proposed SCADA simulation environment in particular
have been taken into consideration. In SCADA systems, there are two types
of networks, corporate/IT network and SCADA network. Special field devices
and SCADA components are employed in SCADA network. Corporate network
connects combination of nodes of different types. Some of these nodes are spe-
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cial SCADA nodes and the rest are normal nodes that are seen usually in IT
networks. Moreover, two kinds of protocols will be employed in the simulation
environment. Internet protocols, such as TCP, IP, UDP, etc. and SCADA spe-
cial industrial protocols. In addition to these specifications related to SCADA
systems, the simulation environment was designed while considering producing
extensive, generic, flexible, reusable and easy-to-use components. Moreover, the
ability to connect simulation environment along with physical devices was taken
into account. Which means that a testbed can be constructed of a combination
of some simulated nodes and other real physical devices communicating with each
other.
The general architecture of the SCADA simulation environment is designed in
four different layers as shown in figure 5.3. The first layer at the bottom of the
hierarchy is composed of SCADA industrial specific modules or real world field
devices such as PLCs, RTUs, etc. The second layer is composed of thoroughly
designed coordination modules which are responsible for the interconnection as
well as the critical time synchronization between the modules. In addition, the
second layer contains the interfacing modules which are responsible for establish-
ing communication with real external devices. The third layer encompasses the
simulation of the different network protocols and modules constructing simula-
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tion components. The top layer consists of the generic applications running inside
simulation or GUI and scripts that allow the user to interface with the developed
environment.
Figure 5.3: SCADA-SST simulation environment architecture
5.2.1 Testbed Components
In order to implement a simulation environment that can be used to model dif-
ferent SCADA architectures, there is a need to model main SCADA components
and the communication networks to connect those components. Following is a
list of various components constructing SCADA-SST with a specification of what
have been done as part of this work.
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• SCADA Components:
OMNeT++ has been used to model main SCADA components, namely, PLC,
RTU, and MTU. In addition, we have used HTML, JavaScript and VS.NET(
WPF) to develop the HMIs used inside SCADA-SST
• SCADA Protocols:
OMNeT++ has been used to simulate Modbus/TCP protocol
• TCP/IP Stack Protocol:
The INET framework implementation of the TCP/IP stack protocol has been
used in proposed simulation environment.
• Real Hardware/Software Interfaces:
Figure 5.4: SCADA-SST interfaces design
In order to connect real hardware/software with simulated modules inside
SCADA-SST, a set of interfaces have been implemented. They are working
as translators that take packets coming from the outside world and convert
them to events; the means of communication in OMNeT++. The design
of SCADA-SST main components and the communication between them is
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shown in figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: SCADA-SST components and communication
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5.3 Testbed Implementation
SCADA-SST was implemented for the sake of building SCADA security testbeds.
Therefore, these security testbeds should resemble the typical SCADA systems.
Figure 5.6 depicts the typical layout of SCADA-SST.
Figure 5.6: SCADA-SST environment layout
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SCADA-SST has been implemented on the top of INET framework mentioned
in section 5.1 and ReaSE tool [30] which is used for creation of realistic environ-
ments. According to the layout of the environment depicted in figure 5.6, the
implemented simulation environment will consist of a set of modules that simu-
late various SCADA components, e.g., PLC, RTU, etc., a collection of protocols;
either those protocols that are used inside the simulation environment to connect
the different modules together or those protocols used to communicate with the
outside world, e.g., modbus protocol. The implemented environment will involve
a custom scheduler as well as interfaces to integrate with real hardware and ap-
plications.
The development process followed the model depicted in figure 5.7. First, the
behavior of every component, needed to be simulated, is studied and analyzed
in order to fully understand what is needed from this component to do or how
it should behave. Then the simulation code is written according to the output
of the behavior analysis phase. After writing the behavior code of the simulated
component, the simulated component is tested to see if it is simulated in the right
way. Finally, the properly simulated component is integrated with the whole sim-
ulation environment and become ready to use.
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Figure 5.7: SCADA-SST development model
In OMNeT++, the term module is used to refer to any simulated node or protocol.
Network components in OMNeT++ are described with the Network Description
Language. With modules and channels to connect modules, two types of modules
exist: simple modules and compound modules. Simple modules implement the
behavior of a certain node or protocol and are, therefore, responsible for all activ-
ity occurring in a component. Their behavior is defined by user in C++ source
code files. Compound modules are containers for simple modules and may contain
any number of simple modules. The network node is comprised of the modules
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and their connections.
In order to develop communication networks as they can be found in SCADA
systems, new compound modules for SCADA components are implemented. The
following SCADA components are taken into account [31]: Remote Terminal Unit
(RTU), Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Master Terminal Unit (MTU),
and Human Machine Interface (HMI). These SCADA components are derived
from INET’s standard modules, meaning they are treated by the simulation ker-
nel as if they were INETs StandardHost module.
In general, RTU and PLC take over the same tasks [32], therefore, they have been
modeled or simulated identically but are present in SCADA-SST as individual
components. The behavior of SCADA-SST components is written in C++ this
allows dynamic binding of the C++ programs describing the behavior of those
modules. Those simulated components communicate with each other via simu-
lated network packets and make decisions based on the packets they receive.
The simulated PLC component, for example, is shown in figure 5.8. The PLC
is a compound module, that consists of several simple modules. The PLC is also
derived from the StandardHost and so INET’s implementation of the OSI stack
is clearly visible inside the TCP/IP connectivity group. The Data Link Layer is
represented by the simple module labeled eth[i] on the bottom. Packets received
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at eth[i] are first passed to the Network Layer protocol and then to the Transport
Layer protocol, where TCP/IP is used. The Application Layer implements the
behavior of the PLC via user-defined C++ code. At this point, the C++ ap-
plications describing the PLC’s behavior are integrated into the PLC compound
module. In the PLC component, there are other INET modules visible on the
left side: NotificationBoard, InterfaceTable and RoutingTable. These modules
are responsible for proper packet routing inside the simulation.
Figure 5.8: SCADA-SST’s PLC component
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Simulated components are always an approximation of the modeled entity since
real world objects are inherently complex and require assumptions to reduce their
complexity in order to derive a feasible model, that can be used in computer simu-
lations. The assumptions for the different SCADA and network components, that
are made during modeling, are discussed at this point. The SCADA components
are based, to some extent, on their descriptions provided in Section 2.2. The com-
munication in the modeled network uses TCP/IP. The simulated components are
capable of communication via UDP and ICMP as well, however, this is not used
in the modeled network. Specialized components for PLC and RTU are present in
the simulation library of SCADA-SST but inside the simulations they are treated
as identical components.
The implementation of SCADA components mentioned above was done using
OMNeT++. However, HMIs used in this work were implemented as real external
applications either web-based applications or WPF applications. The WPF-based
HMIs have been developed using Visual Studio 2012 [33] and OPC Systems.NET
[34]. While the web-based HMIs have been developed using HTML and javascript.
The use of the implemented environment to test effects of various attacks on
a typical SCADA system and to evaluate the various mitigation techniques can
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be done using one of two possible ways. The first method is to simulate the attacks
and mitigation techniques under study and run them as part of the simulation
environment. The second method enables us to use real attacks binaries already
implemented and take benefits of existing software or hardware and launch them
from outside the simulation environment targeting either a component inside the
simulation environment or an external physical component. The latter method
can be used when we do not have the sufficient time and information about at-
tacks and mitigation techniques under study so that we can not simulate them.
OMNeT++ Integrated Development Environment (IDE) enables the users of
SCADA-SST to easily build the needed network topologies without writing any
piece of code, or a little bit of code if any, using the drag and drop functionality of
the IDE’s interactive graphical editor and then setting some topology configura-
tion parameters such as simulation runtime parameters and real external devices
external information.
5.4 Protocol Implementation
In SCADA systems, there are two types of used protocols. The well-known In-
ternet protocols commonly used inside corporate networks and special SCADA
industrial protocols. In SCADA-SST, both types are needed to simulate realistic
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SCADA testbeds. We have used INET implementation of Internet protocols such
as TCP, IP, UDP, MAC, etc. while doing some modification to parts of these pro-
tocols in order to make them behave like real protocols especially when running
malicious attacks. For instance, to launch DoS attack against TCP connections
we need to limit the number of concurrent connections and drop all new connec-
tion requests when the number of active connections reaches this limit. On the
other hand, there is no existing framework that implements SCADA protocols.
Thus, part of this thesis contribution focuses on implementing SCADA proto-
cols. Initially, Modbus/TCP protocol has been implemented . In this work, the
implementation of Modbus/TCP protocol is based on the libmodbus library [35]
stable version v3.0.6. The implementation details of this protocol are given in the
following section.
5.4.1 Modbus/TCP Simulation
Modbus protocol is based on messaging and is widely used to establish master-
slave communications between industrial devices.
Figure 5.9: Modbus TCP architecture
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Because of the nature of Modbus protocol, messaging structure, the implementa-
tion of this protocol is independent of the underlying physical layer. The basic
structure of Modbus message contains the slave address, the command, the data,
and check sum as depicted in figure 5.9. The work of this protocol is based on two
concepts: request and response. In the request, the function code tells the target
slave what kind of action to perform. Along with the function code, the request
may contain additional data that the slave may need to perform. For example,
if the function code was ’read register’, then the request must contain additional
information about which holding registers to read. Moreover, the request check
sum field enables the slave to check the integrity of the message contents. on the
other hand, the response contains copy of the function code sent with the request
or an error code in case of error is happening. In addition, the data bytes contain
the requested data or a description of the error [36, 13, 14, 37, 38].
Modbus protocol supports eight function codes which tell the slave what action
to do as stated in table 5.1. Table 5.2 shows an example of a request to read regis-
ters 0-1 from slave device 1. The response for the request would be as in table 5.3.
The class diagram of the of the modeled modbus/tcp, adjusted from libmod-
bus library, is given in figure 5.10.
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Function code meaning
01 read coil status
02 read input status
03 read holding registers
04 read input registers
05 read single coil
06 write single register
15 write multiple coils
16 write multiple registers
Table 5.1: Modbus function codes
trans id unit function starting registers error check
00 00 00 01 00 03 00 00 00 02 LRC (FA)
Table 5.2: Modbus request example
5.5 Interfacing with External Devices
External devices and applications can be integrated with OMNeT++ using one of
three possible ways [39, 23]. In the first method we can use source code integration
which requires the modification of OMNeT++’s source code. The second method
is the shared library integration where a library used by both OMNeT++ and the
external application is developed. The third method is through the use of socket
connections. i.e. commonly used network protocols are employed for communica-
tion. In order to use the first method, knowledge of OMNeT++’s implementation
is required. The source code needs to be recompiled using the specified build
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trans id unit function byte count data data error
00 00 00 01 00 03 00 04 00 05 00 06 LRC (E D)
Table 5.3: Modbus response example
Figure 5.10: Modbus protocol implementation library
environment. The external application must be integrated into this environment,
which limits the flexibility during design and development specially when con-
necting with physical devices. Moreover, mastering OMNeT++’s implementation
details takes a steep learning curve. The second method is similar to the first
one but it does not require the use of the build environment. However, the use
of OMNeT++’s interfaces is mandatory, which has the same drawbacks as the
first method. In the third way, the minimum changes are required and it imposes
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the minimal restrictions on development. In addition, it is the most flexible for
connecting with physical devices. The integration between SCADA-SST and the
outside world is implemented using sockets.
5.5.1 Interface Concept
One of the requirement of the SCADA-SST simulation environment is to design it
in such way that external real devices may be connected. For this to be satisfied,
interfaces have been implemented so that they are used in the simulation envi-
ronment whenever we need to connect with external real devices. An interface
has been implementedto connect with any device using Modbus/TCP protocol.
Other interfaces are implemented to connect with devices using Internet proto-
cols TCP and UDP as extensions of the INET classes ”CSocketRTScheduler” and
”ExtInterface”.
5.5.2 Interface Implementation
Figure 5.11 shows the class diagram of this work implementation of the mod-
bus interface used to connect with physical components via modbus protocol. In
this implementation, the ModbusFace() routine is responsible for initializing and
creating active instance of the modbus interface. Here, the IP address of the cor-
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responding physical device is specified. The Listen() routine is a procedure that
keeps listening and receives messages from external world. The processMSG()
receives messages from Listen(), process them and forward messages to simulated
modules.
Figure 5.11: Modbus interface structure
The integration between the simulated modules and real external devices can be
done either between those industrial devices that communicate using industrial
protocol Modbus/TCP, or devices that work inside the corporate network using
the well-known Internet protocols, TCP and UDP. To connect with an external
physical devices, an interface node is added to the simulation network topology
and setting a parameter ’externalIP’ to the real IP address of the external physical
device we want to communicate with. The selected interface node must be com-
patible with communication protocol used in the physical device. For example, to
connect with a physical PLC, we must select modbus interface node.
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In order to manage the communication of OMNeT++ with external world, a
custom scheduler has been implemented. The sending and receiving of the pack-
ets from and to the external hardware and applications is still done with sockets,
which are programmed using the Windows Socket API (WSA or Winsock). The
scheduler is necessary for the propagation of the packets, i.e., translating the ex-
ternal packets to internal, simulated packets and vice versa. The scheduler of
SCADA-SST is based on the cSocketRTScheduler, which is presented as a demo
application of OMNeT++.
The ability to integrate the simulation environment with external real devices
increased the functionality of the implemented environment since it would be
possible to evaluate the security of different SCADA components using different
network topologies. With this feature, we can use the simulation environment to
construct different SCADA topologies taking benefit of the existing real devices
and replacing the missing SCADA components or corporate/IT devices with sim-
ulated ones.
52
CHAPTER 6
SCADA-SST USE CASES
In this chapter, two realistic SCADA configurations are designed using the pro-
posed environment. The first configuration is for water distribution control in
which a hybrid architecture of simulated and physical components is presented.
The second configuration is of a smart grid system.
6.1 Water Distribution Use Case
In this case, the SCADA system presented is a combination of simulated compo-
nents, physical hardware and real applications.
The scenario resembles a SCADA system that is used to control the water dis-
tribution in water distribution station. In this case, we have two water tanks,
the first tank, Tank1, is filled from the water source and then used to distribute
water. The second tank, Tank2, is used as an extra tank to reduce the pressure on
Tank1. In case the water level in Tank1 reached a pre-specified level, a transfer
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Figure 6.1: Water distribution network topology
pump between Tank1 and Tank2 would be opened to pass the water from Tank1
to Tank2. In case the water level in both tanks exceeded the permitted water
level, a drain valve on Tank2 would be opened as depicted in the HMI of this
SCADA system shown in figure 6.2.
The RTU collects data from the two tanks’ water-level sensors. The PLC is
connected with the RTU. It reads data from the RTU, processes it, then sends
it to the HMI. Moreover, The PLC receives actions from HMI’s operators and
direct commands that reflect those actions to the field devices through RTU. The
engineering station is used to configure the PLC and to write PLC programs. The
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configuration details of each component is described as follows.
• PLC
The PLC used in this scenario is a real Siemens SIMATIC S7-400 PLC that
has been integrated with the simulated components using modbus/tcp proto-
col. It has been configured to work as a master device to collect data from the
simulated RTU and then sends it to the HMI. Moreover, it forwards operator’s
actions to the RTU.
• RTU
The RTU is simulated using SCADA-SST simulation environment and is used
to gather information from the tanks’ sensors and works as a slave device
listening on port 502 for coming requests from the PLC and then responds
by providing the requested data.
• Engineering Station
Windows 7 host equipped with Siemens Simatic PCS7 V8.0 software which
is a programming and configuration environment for Siemens PLCs. Here,
it is used to configure the physical PLC and connect it with the simulated
components.
• Water-Level Sensors
An implementation of external application is used to simulate the two sensors.
The first sensor is used to measure the water level in Tank1 and the second
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sensor is used to measure the water level in Tank2. This external application
that simulates the two sensors is connected with the RTU in the simulation
environment.
• HMI
The HMI has been developed as real web-based application to receive updates
about the status of the water tanks from PLC and presents it in graphical way
as shown in figure 6.2. In addition, the implemented HMI allows operators to
interact with the controlled field devices by starting/stopping transfer pump
or opening/closing the drain valve. The HMI is running outside the simulation
environment and is connected through the ethernet network with the PLC
working outside the simulation environment.
This scenario shows how we can construct SCADA testbeds by employing the
existing physical hardware, real applications and SCADA-SST simulation envi-
ronment. This configured SCADA testbed will be used in Chapter 7 to conduct
network security analysis of the communication between the PLC and the engi-
neering station.
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Figure 6.2: Water distribution HMI
6.2 Smart Grid Use Case
In this case, the SCADA system presented had been configured using simulated
components, and real applications.
The scenario exemplifies a smart grid system that is used to control electricity
consumption by smart homes. In this case, we have two smart homes, for simplic-
ity, each home is equipped with a smart electric meter that measures the power
consumption and sends these data to electric company. According to the received
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data, the electric company would be able to do the needed actions in order to
enhance the power supplied to the smart home.
Figure 6.3: Smart Grid system network topology
The RTU collects data from the electric meter. The MTU is connected with the
RTU. It reads data from the RTU, then sends it to the HMI. The configuration
details of each component is described as follows.
• MTU
The MTU used in this scenario is a SCADA-SST’s simulated component that
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has been configured to work as a master device to collect data from the
simulated RTU and then sends it to the HMI.
• RTU
The RTU is simulated using SCADA-SST simulation environment and is used
to gather information from a smart home’s electric meter and works as a slave
device listening on port 502 for coming requests from the MTU and then
responds by providing the requested data.
• Electric Meter
An implementation of external application is used to simulate the electric
meter. This external application simulates power consumption reads and is
connected with the RTU in the simulation environment.
• HMI
The HMI has been developed as a real WPF application to receive updates
about the power consumption by the smart homes from MTU and presents
it in graphical way as shown in figure 6.4. The HMI is running outside the
simulation environment and is connected through the ethernet network with
the MTU.
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Figure 6.4: Smart Grid System HMI
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CHAPTER 7
IMPLEMENTED ATTACKS
This chapter exposes a network security analysis of the communication be-
tween PLCs and the engineering stations. Using the water distribution testbed
discussed in Chapter 6, a number of three network attacks have been carried
out leading to serious compromise of typical PLCs. In the subsequent sections,
for every implemented attack we describe: (i) the behavior of the attack, (ii)
the scripts and tools used to configure the attack, and (iii) the nodes used to
launch the attack.
Major PLC manufacturers (Siemens, Allen-Bradley, Phoenix Contact, etc.)
provide efficient software environments to program and configure their PLCs.
The programs are written in a variety of languages including graphical lan-
guages such as Ladder logic. PLC programs need to be efficient, lightweight
and guarantee secure communication with the other field devices once de-
ployed.
Programming a PLC consists of uploading the written program to the PLC
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after it has been developed and tested at an engineering station. Typically,
the engineering station is connected to the PLC with Ethernet. This com-
munication can be point-to-point involving a simple Ethernet cable between
the PLC and the engineering station or is a part of a network including other
stations. Because the PLC program is in charge of controlling how the PLC
works and commands field devices, the upload procedure should be performed
in a secure way. An adversary who can interfere with this uploading proce-
dure can launch a variety of attacks ranging from DOS to seizing full control
of the PLC.
Simatic PCS7 is the programming environment for Siemens PLCs. It is a
comprehensive software suite offering a variety of features to configure con-
trol systems, in particular PLCs. The software provides a graphical user
interface for simple operation and clear display of configuration data. In
order to upload a new configuration program, an engineering station with
Simatic PCS7 software communicates with the PLC through Ethernet and
using COTP (Connection Oriented Transport Protocol).
COTP protocol is not commonly used and is based on a very old specification
(RFC 905 [40]). Very scarce documentation about the protocol is publicly
available and few attempts were made to reverse engineer it [41]. Although
COTP protocol has been replaced by TCP in most applications, it is still
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being used by Simatic PCS7 software. This can be seen as a manifestation of
security-by-obscurity which is common protection measure in ICS.
The three main commands that the engineering station with Simatic PCS7
software can send to the PLC are the following:
– Start Command: turns the PLC on, assuming it is currently turned off.
The start command is typically used when re-programming the PLC. In
particular, the start command packets are sent along with the new PLC
program packets.
– Stop Command: turns off the PLC.
– Check Status: enquires about the current status of the PLC.
Using the water distribution control testbed, described in Chapter 6, equipped
with a common PLC, namely, Siemens S7-400 in addition to its corresponding
configuration software, namely, Simatic PCS7 8.1, we successfully carried out
three network security attacks, as described in the following sections, which
allowed to interfere with the PLC-PCS7 communication and send arbitrary
commands to the PLC. The three security attacks, namely, replay, Man-In-
The-Middle (MiTM), and command modification, are common IT network
security attacks, but they are not typically used to interfere with PLC-PCS7
communication.
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7.1 Replay Attack
The first implemented PLC network attack is a typical replay attack. The
attack consists of 3 steps: starting a PCS7 command (stop, start, etc.), cap-
turing the packets, and replaying the captured packets at a later time. The
captured packets corresponding to a given command are first processed by
filtering out any packets that are not part of the commands traffic. Since
PCS7-PLC communication uses the COTP protocol (port 102), any other
packets are filtered out. In addition, only packets in the PCS7-PLC direction
are kept (packets in the opposite direction are filtered out). The cleaned traf-
fic for each command is then stored in a pcap file.
Initially, tcpreplay [42] suite is used to replay the recorded packets (cleaned
pcap file). tcpreplay suite comes with different tools such as tcpprep (packets
pre-processor that isolates packets in each direction), tcprewrite (pcap file
editor which rewrites packet headers), tcpreplay (replays pcap files onto the
network), etc. Using these tools, the pcap file is pre-processed before replay-
ing by changing the source IP address and recomputing the checksum value
in each packet. Once the pre-processed pcap file is replayed on the PLC, most
of the packets are discarded by the PLC and the replay attack fails. After
investigation, it turns out that the packets are discarded for two main rea-
sons. First, the sequence (SEQ) and acknowledgement (ACK) numbers in the
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replayed packets are not changed. Consequently, the TCP/IP kernel at the
PLC tags those packets as duplicates and discards them. Second, tcpreplay
tool replays the packets in the pcap file one after the other without waiting
for any response from the PLC. Hence, the PLC receives some packets out
of the proper sequence and discards them. This problem has been recently
observed by Maynard et al. [43].
To overcome these problems and to guarantee that the replayed packets are
accepted by the TCP/IP kernel at the PLC, we resorted to write a customized
python script using scapy [44]. Scapy is a powerful packet manipulation pro-
gram written in python and hence can be easily used in python scripts. It
features a variety of packet manipulation capabilities including: sniffing and
replaying packets in the network, network scanning, tracerouting, etc. How-
ever, the most useful scapy features for our replay attack are the ability to
rewrite the sequence and acknowledgement numbers and to match requests
and replies.
Dealing with the duplicate sequence and acknowlgement numbers consists of
recalculating these numbers and rewriting them with scapy. Manipulating
packet headers using scapy is straightforward since any packet field is simply
accessible by the dot operator (e.g. ip.src, tcp.flags, rcv[TCP].seq). Initially,
random sequence and acknowledgement numbers are chosen. Then, at each
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packet sending, the numbers are incremented and added to the next packet.
Replaying packets in the appropriate sequence and time requires waiting for
the response of some packets before releasing the next packet. Scapy provides
several variants of the Send function which is in charge of sending a packet
in the network. For packets not requiring a response (e.g. Acknowlegement
packet), the simple sendp function is used. The sendp function takes as input
the packet as well as the network interface. For packets requiring a response,
several functions can be used:
– sr: Send and receive packets at layer 3
– sr1: Send packets at layer 3 and return only the first answer
– srp: Send and receive packets at layer 2
– srp1: Send and receive packets at layer 2 and return only the first answer
– srloop: Send a packet at layer 3 in loop and print the answer each time
– srploop: Send a packet at layer 2 in loop and print the answer each time
In our program, we used srp1 function because there is always one single
response packet sent by the PLC. Algorithm 1 shows the core of the python
script using the scapy features. The REPLAY subroutine takes as input the
pcap file, the network interface, the attackers IP address and port number.
In addition, arbitrary values are chosen to initialize the ACK and RSTACK
numbers. The for loop inside the subroutine goes through the packets one by
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one. For each packet, TCP checksums are removed (line 7) so that the network
interface card recalculates newer values, the source IP and port numbers are
updated (lines 8 and 9), the sequence numbers are incremented (lines 11 and
19), the packet is replayed using either sendp function (for SYN and RST
packets) or the srp1 function (lines 13 and 18).
Algorithm 1 Replay a sequence of captured packets using Scapy
1: function replay(pcapfile, eth interface, srcIP, srcPort)
2: recvSeqNum ← 0
3: SY N ← True
4: for packet in rdpcap(pcapfile) do
5: ip ← packet[IP ]
6: tcp ← packet[TCP ]
7: del ip.chksum
8: ip.src ← srcIP
9: ip.sport ← srcPort
10: if tcp.flags == ACK or tcp.flags == RSTACK then
11: tcp.ack ← recvSeqNum + 1
12: if SYN or tcp.flags == RSTACK then
13: sendp(packet, iface=eth interface)
14: SY N ← False
15: continue
16: end if
17: end if
18: rcv ← srp1(packet, iface = eth interface)
19: recvSeqNum ← rcv[TCP ].seq
20: end for
21: end function
The above python program has been tested using two attack scenarios. In
the first scenario, the replay attack was launched from the same host (IP
address) used for the capture, that is, the host with PCS7 software. In the
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second scenario, the replay attack was launched from a different host on the
same network, that is, the attacker machine with Kali. In each scenario, two
types of commands are tried, namely, start and stop. The replay attack was
successful in both scenarios for both types of commands. Hence, an unknown
attacker machine (without PCS7 software) on the same network can turn the
PLC ON or OFF by simply replaying a start or stop command. This clearly
might cause significant damage to a SCADA system.
7.2 Man-In-The-Middle (MiTM) Attack
The communication between PCS7 host and the PLC uses COTP over Eth-
ernet. Ethernet protocol uses Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). Hence,
theoretically the communication is vulnerable to Man In The Middle (MiTM)
attacks through ARP Poisoning.
In a switched Ethernet network, a host A who tries to communicate with a
host B (with a known IP address) needs its physical address (MAC). The
MAC address can be obtained by broadcasting an ARP request to all hosts
in the network. In a normal scenario, only host B will send a response with
the correct IP-MAC pair. In an attack scenario, an attacker (host C) in the
same network will send a fake response with a false IP-MAC claiming to be
the owner of B’s IP address. Typically, the attacker floods the network with
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its fake response forcing the victim host (A) to accept the false pairing and
ignore the correct one sent by host B. ARP poisoning is typically launched
between two hosts allowing the attacker to insert himself as a tunnel between
the two victims and consequently sniff all packets between them.
In our scenario, an ARP poisoning MiTM attack is implemented between the
PCS7 host and the PLC using ettercap tool [45]. The attack is successful and
all the packets exchanged between the PCS7 and PLC are tunneled through
the attacker host (Kali). A MiTM attack can be passive or active. A passive
version consists in simply observing the traffic of the PLC and hence break-
ing the confidentiality of the commands sent to the PLC. An active version
is more dangerous since it allows the attacker to tamper with the packets
and commands and consequently interfere with the normal operation of the
system.
7.3 Stealth Command Modification Attack
The third attack is a combination of replay and MiTM attacks which aims
at sniffing the traffic between the PCS7 and PLC and then interfering with
sent commands by replaying other commands in a stealth way. Through this
attack, an adversary can completely change the behavior of the SCADA sys-
tem since sending a command leads to the execution of another command.
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The attack goes through three main steps: MiTM attack, command detection,
and replay of a false command. Figure 7.1 illustrates the attack. Initially,
the attacker (Kali) starts by launching a MiTM attack to place himself be-
tween the PCS7 and the PLC exactly as described in the previous section.
Then, it stays in an idle state observing the traffic passively and waiting for
commands sent by the PCS7 host to the PLC (Step 1 in Figure 7.1). For the
sake of command detection in the network, Snort intrusion detection system
(IDS) [46] is used. Snort is a signature-based network IDS which allows to
detect patterns of traffic inside the network. Currently, Snort is configured
to detect two types of commands, namely, start and stop. As soon as the
attacker detects a command from the PCS7 host to the PLC (Step 2), a dif-
ferent command will be replayed to the PLC (Step 4). That is, if a start
command is detected, the attacker replays a stop command to the PLC. If
a stop command is detected, the attacker replays a start command (with a
different PLC program) to the PLC. However, it is easy to notice that if the
attacker interferes with a start command to make it a stop command (or the
opposite), the PCS7 will quickly notice that something is wrong. To make the
attack as stealth as possible, the attacker continues the communication with
the PCS7 host while impersonating the PLC (Step 3). So for the PCS7 host
the communication appears to be perfectly normal. This technique has been
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used by Stuxnet [47] in its famous attack on Iran’s nuclear facility. Indeed,
to make the attack stealth, Stuxnet recorded normal frequency values. Then,
at attack time, it played those recorded frequencies to make the monitoring
system believes that centrifuges are operating as normal [47, 48].
Snort is an IDS which allows only to detect known patterns in the net-
Figure 7.1: Stealth command modification attack
work traffic. However, the stealth command modification attack requires the
launching of the replay attack (python program) as soon as a command is
detected in the traffic. To fill this gap, Snort is configured to log alerts to
Syslog-ng utility [49]. In turn, Syslog-ng is configured to trigger the replay
attack upon the reception of appropriate Snort alerts.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter summarizes the work of this thesis. In addition, it outlines
possibilities for future work and addresses open problems.
8.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, a simulation environment, SCADA-SST, for building SCADA
security testbeds is developed. As security issues affecting SCADA systems
have become intensive, the need to have security testbeds where security re-
searchers and specialists can conduct various security scenarios is immense.
The security tests are for the sake of enhancing the security of SCADA sys-
tems and providing better security solutions for current systems. Therefore,
a simulation environment that can provide a close to real simulations for se-
curity analysis is highly appreciated. In this work, the introduced simulation
environment has been evaluated by configuring two realistic SCADA security
testbeds in which a combination of simulated and physical SCADA compo-
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nents were used synchronously. The introduced environment was developed
to involve generic and extensible components and to support hybrid archi-
tectures as well. The work overcomes the issues and weaknesses of the most
relevant approaches found in the literature. For example, the components
were designed to be generic enough and extensible in order to be used in
building different SCADA architectures. The components were implemented
with a generic behavior so that they can be adopted to build different SCADA
architectures without considering any restrictions to specific systems with the
ability to extend the behavior of any component by dynamic binding of C++
class libraries. In addition, the environment provides the ability to launch
cyber attacks, in order to test their effects, either from inside the simulation
or using real binaries of cyber attacks. In the evaluation, one of the most com-
mon PLCs has been used along with the simulated components. On the other
hand, there is a number of SCADA protocols used for the communication in-
side SCADA systems and in this work, Modbus/TCP has been modeled and
there still a need to model further SCADA protocols to be able to enhance
the security of most SCADA systems. In addition, this work has modeled
the main SCADA components, namely PLC, RTU, MTU and HMI because
of their common uses in SCADA systems.
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Another key contribution of this thesis is the study and analyze of the security
of the network communication between typical SIMATIC PLCs and the en-
gineering stations mainly used for PLCs configuration and re-programming.
The water tanks control testbed was used to conduct this analysis. It was
demonstrated that a SCADA system can be seriously compromised by mount-
ing network attacks targeting PLCs. PLCs are very common components in
SCADA systems. They sit between HMIs and field devices and are in charge
of sending commands and receiving data to/from field devices. Since a PLC
is programmable, it can be completely compromised by loading a malicious
control program. Through the detailed description and implementation of
three attacks (Replay, MITM, and command modification), we showed that
the communication between the PLC and the engineering station can be com-
promised leading to serious SCADA system instability. We showed that, with
open source tools and simple python scripts, one can mount successful at-
tacks. In particular, programming and configuration traffic directed to PLCs
may be replayed, sniffed, and/or modified.
8.2 Future Work
The work of this thesis highlights the possibilities for further work in various
directions. Following is a list of open topics that may be considered in our
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future work.
• Developing and/or testing detection techniques of the network attacks
presented in this thesis in addition to other cyber attacks targeting SCADA
systems.
• Simulating further SCADA industrial protocols in the simulation envi-
ronment.
• Analyzing the security of further SCADA components and protocols
while involving other commonly used SCADA special components and/or
softwares from different vendors.
75
REFERENCES
[1] “Dell security annual threat report.”
https://software.dell.com/docs/2015-dell-security-annual-threat-report-
white-paper-15657.pdf, 2015. [Online; accessed May-2015].
[2] M. Cheminod, L. Durante, and A. Valenzano, “Review of security issues
in industrial networks,” Industrial Informatics, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 9, pp. 277–293, Feb 2013.
[3] R. R. R. Barbosa, Anomaly detection in SCADA systems: a network
based approach. University of Twente, 2014.
[4] T. C. for SCADA Security Sandia National Labs, “National scada
testbed.” http://energy.sandia.gov/energy/ssrei/gridmod/cyber-
security-for-electric-infrastructure/scada-systems/testbeds/national-
scada-testbed. [Online; accessed March-2015].
[5] N. Laboratory, “National scada test bed program.”
https://www.inl.gov/scada/. [Online; accessed March-2015].
[6] G. Deconinck, H. Beitollahi, G. Dondossola, F. Garrone, and T. Rigole,
“Testbed deployment of representative control algorithms,” Deliverable
D9, Project CRUTIAL EC IST-FP6-STREP, vol. 27513, 2008.
[7] P. D. P. A. H. S. L. G. M. M. W. T. Jack Wiles, Ted Claypoole and J. H.
Windle, Techno Security’s Guide to Securing SCADA. ELSEVIER, 2008.
[8] NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems, TECHNICAL INFORMATION
BULLETIN 04-1, october 2004 ed.
[9] R. L. Krutz, Securing SCADA systems. John Wiley & Sons, 2005.
[10] Siemens, “The simatic pcs7 process control system, tech. rep..” , April
2013.
[11] A. G. Association et al., “Cryptographic protection of scada communi-
cations; part 2: retrofit link encryption for asynchronous serial commu-
nications,” tech. rep., AGA Report, 2005.
76
[12] E. J. Byres, M. Franz, and D. Miller, “The use of attack trees in assess-
ing vulnerabilities in scada systems,” in Proceedings of the International
Infrastructure Survivability Workshop, Citeseer, 2004.
[13] MODICON, Inc., Industrial Automation Systems, Modicon Modbus Pro-
tocol Reference Guide, june 1996 ed.
[14] I. Modbus Organization, “Modbus home page.”
http://www.modbus.org. [Online; accessed Augus-2015].
[15] ABB, DNP3 Communication Protocol Manual, february 2011 ed.
[16] I. C. S. C. E. R. Team, “Trends in incident response in 2013,” 2013.
[17] M. Haney and M. Papa, “A framework for the design and deployment of a
scada honeynet,” in Proceedings of the 9th Annual Cyber and Information
Security Research Conference, pp. 121–124, ACM, 2014.
[18] B. Zhu, A. Joseph, and S. Sastry, “A taxonomy of cyber attacks on scada
systems,” in Internet of Things (iThings/CPSCom), 2011 International
Conference on and 4th International Conference on Cyber, Physical and
Social Computing, pp. 380–388, Oct 2011.
[19] A. A. Ca´rdenas, S. Amin, and S. Sastry, “Research challenges for the
security of control systems.,” in Hot topics in security, 2008.
[20] J. Pollet, “Innovative defense strategies for securing scada and control
systems,” Technical Papers of ISA, vol. 459, pp. 115–128, 2005.
[21] T. C. S. R. H. C. Michael J. McDonald, Gregory N. Conrad, “Cyber
effects analysis using vcse-promoting control system reliability,” andia
National Laboratories Report (SAND2008-5954), 2008.
[22] R. Chabukswar, B. Sino´poli, G. Karsai, A. Giani, H. Neema, and
A. Davis, “Simulation of network attacks on SCADA systems,” in First
Workshop on Secure Control Systems, 2010.
[23] C. Queiroz, A. Mahmood, and Z. Tari, “SCADASim a framework for
building SCADA simulations,” Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 589–597, 2011.
[24] W. Chunlei, F. Lan, and D. Yiqi, “A simulation environment for
SCADA security analysis and assessment,” in Measuring Technology and
77
Mechatronics Automation (ICMTMA), 2010 International Conference
on, vol. 1, pp. 342–347, IEEE, 2010.
[25] A. Almalawi, Z. Tari, I. Khalil, and A. Fahad, “SCADAVT-a framework
for SCADA security testbed based on virtualization technology,” in Local
Computer Networks (LCN), 2013 IEEE 38th Conference on, pp. 639–646,
IEEE, 2013.
[26] W. Mahoney and R. A. Gandhi, “An integrated framework for control
system simulation and regulatory compliance monitoring,” International
Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 41–53,
2011.
[27] INET framework 2.1 for OMNeT++.Manual, version 4.6 ed., 2014.
[28] A. Varga and R. Hornig, “An overview of the omnet++ simulation en-
vironment,” in Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Simu-
lation tools and techniques for communications, networks and systems
& workshops, p. 60, ICST (Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-
Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering), 2008.
[29] Andrs Varga and OpenSim Ltd., OMNeT++ User Manual, version
4.6 ed., 2014.
[30] T. Gamer and M. Scharf, “Realistic simulation environments for ip-
based networks,” in Proceedings of the 1st international conference on
Simulation tools and techniques for communications, networks and sys-
tems & workshops, p. 83, ICST (Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-
Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering), 2008.
[31] V. M. Igure, S. A. Laughter, and R. D. Williams, “Security issues in scada
networks,” Computers & Security, vol. 25, no. 7, pp. 498–506, 2006.
[32] C. Ie, “Programmable controllers—part 3: Programming languages,”
2003.
[33] “Microsoft visual studio professional 2012.”
http://www.microsoft.com/en-sa/download/details.aspx?id=30682.
[34] “Opc systems.net.” https://www.opcsystems.com.
78
[35] “Open source c library of modbus protocol for linux, mac os x, freebsd,
qnx and win32, v3.0.6.” http://libmodbus.org, 2014. [Online; accessed
Augus-2015].
[36] P. Huitsing, R. Chandia, M. Papa, and S. Shenoi, “Attack taxonomies for
the modbus protocols,” International Journal of Critical Infrastructure
Protection, vol. 1, pp. 37–44, 2008.
[37] I. Modbus, “Modbus application protocol specification v1. 1a,” North
Grafton, Massachusetts (www. modbus. org/specs. php), 2004.
[38] I. Modbus, “Modbus messaging on tcp/ip implementation guide v1. 0b,”
North Grafton, Massachusetts (www. modbus. org/specs. php), 2006.
[39] C. P. Mayer and T. Gamer, “Integrating real world applications into
omnet++,” Institute of Telematics, University of Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe,
Germany, Tech. Rep. TM-2008-2, 2008.
[40] N. W. Group, “Iso transport protocol specification, tech. rep..” , April
1984.
[41] G. Devarajan, “Unraveling scada protocols: Using sulley fuzzer,” in De-
fon 15 Hacking Conf, 2007.
[42] “tcpreplay.” http://tcpreplay.synfin.net/.
[43] P. Maynard, K. McLaughlin, and B. Haberler, “Towards understanding
man-in-the-middle attacks on iec 60870-5-104 scada networks,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on ICS & SCADA Cyber
Security Research 2014, pp. 30–42, BCS, 2014.
[44] P. Biondi, “Scapy.” http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy.
[45] ALor and NaGA, “Ettercap.” http://ettercap.sourceforge.net.
[46] M. Roesch et al., “Snort: Lightweight intrusion detection for networks.,”
in LISA, vol. 99, pp. 229–238, 1999.
[47] N. Falliere, L. O. Murchu, and E. Chien, “W32. stuxnet dossier,” White
paper, Symantec Corp., Security Response, vol. 5, 2011.
[48] S. Zhioua, “The middle east under malware attack dissecting cyber
weapons,” in Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW),
2013 IEEE 33rd International Conference on, pp. 11–16, IEEE, 2013.
79
[49] R. Gerhards, “The syslog protocol,” 2009.
80
Appendices
81
Appendix A: Installation & Configuration
1. Installation
In order to use SCADA-SST, you must have installed OMNeT++ and
the according version of INET framework
– Install OMNeT++
Install the prerequisite packages by executing the following command:
$ sudo apt-get install build-essential gcc g++ bison flex perl \
tcl-dev tk-dev blt libxml2-dev zlib1g-dev openjdk-7-jre \
doxygen graphviz openmpi-bin libopenmpi-dev libpcap-dev
Extract the downloaded OMNeT++ files:
$ tar zxvf omnetpp-4.2.1-src.tgz
Setup the environment variables:
$ cd omnetpp-4.2.1
$ . setenv
Then run configure:
$ ./configure
Finally, compile the simulator:
$ make
Make sure that OMNeT++ has been installed successfully through run-
ning one of the sample simulations packaged with OMNeT++.
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$ cd samples/dyna
$ ./dyna
– Install INET Framework
Download the corresponding version of INET
https://inet.omnetpp.org
Extract the downloaded files:
tar xjf inet20111118-src.tar.gz
Then start the OMNeT++ IDE by entering
$ omnetpp
Then import INET as an existing project
File -> Import... -> General -> Existing Projects into Workspace
Select the directory you previously extracted the INET archive to as
root directory. Now INET should appear within the list of projects.
Press Finish
Start compiling by entering
Ctrl + B
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– Install SCADA-SST
Extract SCADA-SST files
tar xzf SCADA-SST-src.tar.gz
Start the OMNeT++ IDE and import SCADA-SST as an existing
project
File -> Import... -> General -> Existing Projects into Workspace
Select the directory you previously extracted the SCADA-SST archive
to as root directory. Now SCADA-SST should appear within the list
of projects.
Press finish
Start compiling by entering
Ctrl + B
2. Connecting SIMATIC S7 PLCs with SCADA-SST
To integrate physical Siemens SIMATIC PLC with simulated nodes; either
master or slave nodes; inside SCADA-SST kindly follow the instructions
in the following document.
http://www.controltechnology.com/Files/common-documents/applicationnotes/Communication−
to− Simatic− S7− using − open−modbus
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